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“Helios rückt die Träume aus dem Nachlass”:  
Romantic Imagination and Dream Life  
in Hannah Arendt’s Thought 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The article aims at presenting Hannah Arendt’s complicated relation with romanticism 
and romantic imagination and pays particular attention to dream life. It discovers that 
the theme of dreams-that-turn-out-to-be-real-life mysteriously appears throughout 
Arendt’s works. The primary source of this theme would be a self-reflective essay Die 
Schatten written in 1925 by 19-year-old Arendt, in which she admits that in dreams 
she lives “her proper life” (ihr eigentliches Leben) and feels internal harmony as well as 
harmony with the world. Interestingly, the essay ends with a wish to have, in the real life, 
scope for free verbal expression that would enable her to “release her soul,” thus to dwell 
in a real, non-perfect version of dreamlike harmony. This source—as well as other texts, 
including the book on Rahel Varnhagen and unknown youthful notes on Sophocles—
allows me to find out that it is both tempting and justified to describe Arendt’s mature 
concept of political realm as a realm where the involuntary features of dreams, namely 
the perfect expression of uniqueness of the individual as well as his or her internal har-
mony and harmony with the world, are to some extent recaptured. 
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Introductory Remarks about Arendt  
and Romantic Imagination 
 
The role of romantic imagination in Hannah Arendt’s thought is a rich yet un-
explored subject. Before seeking romantic imagination in Arendt’s thought, it is 
important to point out the fragments where Arendt seems to explicitly stand 
against romantic sensibility. Firstly, in The Origins of Totalitarianism there are 
two pages where Arendt ironises the romantic “unlimited idolization of the 
‘personality’ of the individual, whose very arbitrariness became the proof of 
genius.”1 Of course we have to remember that in The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
Arendt’s critique of romanticism, despite having something in common with 
the critique of free emotional expression, is mainly against “race-thinking” that 
arises from the concept of “innate personality,” which is, according to Arendt, 
dependent only on being born and not on thoughts and deeds—a concept that 
I think is kind of corruption of romanticism and does not manifest true roman-
tic individualism. Secondly, Arendt criticizes romantic approach in her essay 
Civil Disobedience. In her opinion, since politics is (only) about saving the public 
space and not about Thoreau-like postulate of harmonisation between individ-
ual purposes and politics, the rule of personal feelings should be of a minor 
role. For Arendt—at least in her essay on civil disobedience—emotional, spiri-
tual and economic will to uphold values such as “justice” leads to “fanaticism.”2 
On the other hand, it is incontestable that at a more general level, Hannah 
Arendt was a thinker of romantic imagination. Although Arendt understands 
imagination primarily in Kantian terms3—as a tool for “representing what is 
absent” so that one can guess causes and consequences of some political events 
or objectify his or her subjective feelings in order to make them understand-
able for the largest possible number of people—this kind of appreciation of 
imagination, along with Arendt’s emphasis on pluralistic diversity of citizens’ 
opinions, also opens the door to the romantic imagination of an individual, 
imagination where personal experiences and feelings are a help in reasoning 
(and I suspect that this is why Arendt’s concept of plurality is not welcomed by 
                                                 
1 H. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, Orlando–New York 1979, pp. 165–170. 
2 Eadem, Civil Disobedience, [in:] eadem, Crises of the Republic, San Diego–New York–Lon-
don 1972, pp. 61–67. 
3 Cf. eadem, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, University of Chicago Press 1992; 
W. Heuer, ‘Imagination Is the Prerequisite of Understanding’ (Arendt). The Bridge Between 
Thinking and Judging, [in:] Hannah Arendt: Filosofia e Totalitarismo, eds. F. Fiscetti and F. R. 
Recchia Luciani, Genoa 2007, [online] http://www.wolfgang-heuer.com/wp-content/up-
loads/heuer_wolfgang_imagination_bari.pdf [accessed: 15.06.2019]. 
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some conservative-Hegelian thinkers4 who fear that in this kind of politics an 
individual would “drink too deeply of the strong wine of freedom;”5 but this is 
also true that mainstream liberals who are accustomed to political polarisation, 
despite seeming to be diversity-friendly, also oppose the diversity that sur-
passes the polarisation6). In other words, the strict division of world-views that 
is characteristic of modern party politics does not encompass the infinity of 
possible opinions—the infinity that Arendt praises by placing emphasis on 
spontaneity and unpredictability of speech understood as political action—
and for this reason a person having his or her individual set of opinions, using 
his or her romantic imagination, is welcomed. As Arendt claims in On Revolu-
tion, “Public opinion, by virtue of its unanimity, provokes a unanimous opposi-
tion and thus kills true opinions everywhere.”7 This general premise of 
Arendt’s thinking is more important than her several ironic commentaries 
about romanticism and her claim to divide the private realm from the political 
realm. 
Precisely speaking, Arendt’s concept of politics, despite downgrading per-
sonal romantic motivations in her radical essay Civil Disobedience, consists 
primarily in undoubtedly romantic idea of manifesting one’s “uniqueness” in 
public action.8 In The Human Condition the thinker claims that an individual 
who acts in the public realm discloses more than mere rational meaning of his 
or her words: an acting person shows “the daimon who accompanies each 
man throughout life.”9 Arendt, using the quote from Karen Blixen: “All sorrows 
can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about them,”10 claims 
that through public action an individual “tells her story,” which means that 
a personal point of view, imagination and experience are present as well as so-
called “rational arguments.” For Arendt, the action—perhaps not only po-
                                                 
4 Cf. Z. Stawrowski, Solidarność znaczy więź (Solidarity Means a Bond), Kraków 2010, 
pp. 99–102. 
5 Cf. Plato, The Republic, trans. B. Jowett, Rockville 2018, p. 410. 
6 An exact example from Poland is the critique of so-called “symmetry thinking,” namely, 
having one’s own set of opinions which surpasses political battle between leftist-liberal op-
position and conservative-traditionalist government. In one of articles, liberal journalists 
directly criticized „individualism of thinking”: M. Janicki, W. Władyka, Klątwa politycznego 
symetryzmu (The Fate of Political Symmetry Thinking), “Polityka”, 03.05.2016. I am aware of 
quoting a press article instead of a philosophical work; however, I am sure that the critique of 
individualist, independent thinking has a deeper philosophical dimension and might bring 
severe consequences. 
7 H. Arendt, On Revolution, London 1990, p. 226. 
8 Eadem, The Human Condition, Chicago 2019, p. 176. 
9 Ibidem, p. 193. 
10 Ibidem, p. 175. 
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litical—is possible only if we “imagine that things might as well be different 
from what they actually are:”11 the effects of this imagination and hope, the two 
romantic concepts, are directly and indirectly disclosed by the acting person. 
Of course, in The Human Condition the philosopher does not identify the acting 
citizen with the storyteller: the storyteller is rather a historian who describes 
political events from a distanced perspective—Arendt writes that “action re-
veals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the 
historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about than the par-
ticipants.”12 But even acknowledging this view, we must admit that Arendt’s 
vision of the “revelatory character of action and speech”13 is about storytelling 
being done by the acting individual herself. Even if the actor, as Arendt 
strangely claims, does not know what exactly he reveals, he feels the “urge of 
self-disclosure,”14 which clearly means to me the desire to tell something. 
Of course, this kind of storytelling is actor’s “talking about himself/herself,” 
which mixes subjective and objective elements and romantically makes the 
subjectivity a window through which we see objectivity, while the historian 
wants to tell the story as scientifically and objectively as possible, and to take 
all possible data into consideration. My task is not to answer which way of 
storytelling is better—I just want to accentuate that political action was for 
Arendt a kind of storytelling done by an acting citizen. Arendt makes it clear in 
her later work, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, when she claims that 
“spectator sits in every actor”15 because the acting person’s capacity to judge 
makes himself “understood”16 by others. In other words, the actor-spectator 
“creates”17 the public realm by his or her storytelling. 
Although Arendt says that public action is “distinguished from mere bodily 
existence,” I think that this is her affirmation of the—as she herself wrote—
“individualist”18 willpower to disclose the self and gain fame outside home 
rather than the conservative abandonment of so-called “sinful sensitive needs” 
for the sake of “common good” that provokes her to say that the public “ap-
pearance […] is an initiative from which no human being can refrain and still be 
human.”19 Another example of Arendt’s romanticism seems to be the fact that 
                                                 
11 Eadem, Lying in Politics, [in] eadem, Crises of the Republic, op. cit., p. 5. 
12 Eadem, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 192. 
13 Ibidem. 
14 Ibidem, p. 194. 
15 Eadem, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 63. 
16 Ibidem. 
17 Ibidem. 
18 Eadem, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 194. 
19 Ibidem, p 176. I think the very concept of politics as disclosing person’s uniqueness is 
the way to overcome Arendt’s sharp “conservative” distinction between the private need of 
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the philosopher also used to illustrate political and philosophical phenomena 
with pieces of poetry, as if they were equally important as academic works, and 
even more revealing than the latter. In The Human Condition the philosopher 
quotes Rilke’s poems: the first of them is about pain and the second one about 
art.20 The book On Revolution ends with Sophocles’s words: “Not to be born 
prevails over all meaning uttered in words; by far the second-best for life, once 
it has appeared, is to go as swiftly as possible whence it came.”21 This is the 
same book where Arendt romantically claimed that “opposition between pas-
sion and reason is not enlightening.”22 Finally, at the very end of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism Arendt seems to defend romantic imagination, understood as 
the idea that individual’s interpretation of reality that affirms the hopes of an 
individual is demonstration of truth, while the process of defeating good inter-
pretations, “always reducing one thing from the other and thinking everything 
to the worst” is against the truth and is pre-totalitarian.23 A good example of 
this romantic affirmation of individual hopes appears in part IV of Adam 
Mickiewicz’s Forefathers’ Eve, where Gustaw—a young man who is unhappily 
in love—does not succumb to a priest’s suggestion that he does not know 
The Holy Bible. Then in line with his spiritual experience, Gustaw develops his 
own theology of love between a man and a woman. He claims that even before 
the birth of specific people, God chooses a man and a woman to be together 
forever—and following this kind of love cannot be a sin. 
 
Dreaming as Perfect Harmony, Political Participation  
as Non-perfect Harmony? 
 
When I speak about romantic imagination, I also mean the phenomenon of 
treating dreams as an important part of individual’s life. In The Age of Romanti-
cism Joanne Schneider observes: “Romantic artists […] were obsessed with 
dreams and their insights about the past and future. Many Romantics felt that 
while dreaming, the individual could return to mankind’s lost unity.”24 Schnei-
der gives here an example of the theme of dreaming in John Keats’s poem 
                                                                                                                   
well-being and the political world: according to Arendt economic needs make people similar 
and it results in the transformation of creative citizens into passive voters; however, in the 
democratic participation the economic experience can be part of uniqueness of an acting 
person. 
20 Eadem, The Human Condition, op. cit., pp. 51 and 168. 
21 Eadem, On Revolution, op. cit., p. 281. 
22 Ibidem, p. 225. 
23 Eadem, Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., pp. 477–478. 
24 J. Schneider, The Age of Romanticism, Westport–London 2007, p. 44. 
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“Endymion,”25 where we can read that after his journey the poet “sang the 
story up into the air, / giving it universal freedom,” but even earlier “the forest 
told it in a dream / to a sleeping lake, whose cool and level gleam / a poet 
caught as he was journeying.”26 Speaking out one’s own story and giving it 
worldly-political “freedom” to be preserved (a theme which is important for 
Arendt) is anticipated by dreaming about the forests and lakes (and pre-
sumably strange creatures such as common goldeneyes), which tell this story 
each other and discuss it. The importance of dreams occurs also in Mickiewicz’s 
prologue to part III of Forefathers’ Eve, when a dream is presented as a place 
where a dreaming individual can hear messages from God, angels and heavenly 
souls. In Mickiewicz’s play, the angel tells Gustaw that it was somehow inter-
playing with Gustaw in his dreams so that good thoughts and good scenarios 
could be found during the dream: “Through the night I stood attending / To the 
passions of your dream / Like a lily pale and bending / O’er a muddied, rushing 
stream. / Often did that evil press / Give my spirit sick offense, / Yet I sought, 
though it were weak, / Just one gleam of righteousness.”27 According to these 
words—even if we treat the transcendent element as a metaphor and not as 
a sign from God—in dreams an individual gets inspiration for acting in the 
waking world, and is informed about his or her strengths. Hope is understood 
as the search for “just one gleam of righteousness” in me and in others, the 
search that is open to the unknown, to the spontaneous (instead of the conser-
vative “hope to defeat individualists and subjectivists,” a hope expressed e. g. by 
Chantal Delsol and Polish intellectual group “Political Theology,” where roman-
tic concept of hope gets corrupted). Hope, understood as romantic “searching 
for just one gleam of righteousness” in the individual’s situation, cannot only be 
a good description of Arendt’s defence of romantic imagination and the concept 
of initium and of manifestation of uniqueness, expressed in some parts of 
The Human Condition as well as in the final paragraphs of The Origins of Totali-
tarianism (the paragraphs against the “ice-cold reasoning” like Hegel’s postu-
lates; one of these postulates, I think, is “destroying the particularity,” especially 
the particularity of the one who is “an innocent flower,”28 namely, the one who 
is a romantic individualist who wants to have a bit of consolation in his or her 
hope). 
                                                 
25 Ibidem, p. 20. 
26 J. Keats, Endymion: A Poetic Romance, London 1818, p. 92. 
27 A. Mickiewicz, Forefathers’ Eve, trans. G. R. Noyes, [in:] Polish Romantic Drama, ed. H. B. 
Segel, Amsterdam 1997, p. 50. 
28 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cam-
bridge 1984, p. 89. 
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The “search of righteousness” in a person’s history and meandering 
thoughts, as well as the related phenomenon of uniqueness of a person, can 
also be manifested in Arendt’s affirmation of dream life, starting from her de-
scription of dreaming as internal harmony in April 1925 in her self-reflexive 
essay Die Schatten. Later the theme, which I define as dreams-that-turn-out-to- 
-be-real-life, was mysteriously returning in Hannah Arendt’s thought. In The 
Human Condition Arendt observes that “even dreams are real, since they pre-
suppose a dreamer and a dream”29 and it seems that her observation is some-
thing more than part of the irony of Cartesian thinking. In The Life of the Mind 
the thinker tells two stories about suspicion that dreams are our true life: 
firstly, she reflects upon the philosopher Chuang Chou who “once dreamt he 
was a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as 
he pleased” but who after awakening “didn’t know if he was Chuang Chou who 
had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming it was Chuang Chou.”30 
Secondly, referring to Blaise Pascal, Arendt observes that the Cartesian mode of 
“certainty of I-am” “would hardly be sufficient to distinguish between dream 
and reality: a poor artisan dreaming for twelve hours every night that he was 
a king would have the same life (and enjoy the same amount of ‘happiness’) as 
a king who dreamed every night that he was nothing but a poor artisan. More-
over, since ‘one frequently dreams that he is dreaming,’ nothing can guarantee 
that what we call our life is not wholly a dream from which we shall awaken in 
death.”31 
In Die Schatten young Arendt clearly describes dream life as the place of in-
ternal harmony, even as the “proper life” (das eigentliche Leben), which disap-
pears while she is awakening. As Arendt wrote about herself in 1925: 
 
Every time she woke up from that long, dreamy and yet deep sleep, in which one merges 
entirely with what one dreams, she felt the same shy, hesitant tenderness toward the 
things of the world, which made clear to her how much of her proper life [ihres eigent-
lichen Lebens] had sunken completely into itself—like sleep, one might say, if there can 
be anything comparable to it in normal life—and how much had run its course.32 
                                                 
29 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 281. 
30 H. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, San Diego-New York-London 1981, p. 198. 
31 Ibidem, p. 150. 
32 H. Arendt, M. Heidegger, Letters 1925–1975, trans. A. Shields, Harcourt, London 2004. 
Quoted from Martin Travers’s biography of Heidegger: https://martinheideggerbiography. 
com/biographies-1916-1923/ [accessed: 7.07.2019]. I changed the words “her actual life” to 
“her proper life” because I think the changed version corresponds better with the German 
original by Arendt: H. Arendt, M. Heidegger, Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse, ed. 
U. Ludz, Frankfurt am Main 2013, pp. 21–25. 
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According to this view, the events which occur in dreams, together with ac-
tions of a dreaming person, are—contrary to the waking life—fully encompass-
ing the individuality of a dreaming person and, moreover, clarifying the per-
son's observations concerning the world. Let us compare the beginning of Die 
Schatten with its end, where the young philosopher expresses her specific 
wish: “Perhaps her soul will realise what it is to speak out and to be released 
under a different sky.” It is clear that she wants, to the possible extent, the in-
ternal harmony and the harmony with the world, experienced in dreams and 
described at the beginning of her essay, to be recaptured in real life. Young 
Arendt suggests that in real life, the possibility of this harmony slips away, and 
that this situation needs to be changed. The wish of young Arendt is the follow-
ing: she wants to have a “different sky,” free space where she, and of course 
other people as well, will have an opportunity to “speak out.” What a discovery, 
if we look at these words from the perspective of Arendt’s later political 
thought! The phenomenon of “speaking out” as the manifestation of freedom 
and personal uniqueness is what would later be Arendt's theoretical-political 
postulate.33 Although Arendt got directly interested in meta-political freedom 
in a turbulent era of the 1930s and 1940s, we can suppose that a specific vision 
of (and yearning for) essential features of that freedom, though not called “po-
litical,” were present in her mind while calligraphing Die Schatten in April 1925 
at the desk in Königsberg; all the more so in the winter 1925–1926 when she 
wrote a poem “An die Freunde” (“To Friends”) where the theme of not having 
a homeland appears. In the poem she admits that she stares with “a glance of 
the one who does not have the homeland”—“der Blick des Heimatlosen.”34 
Given that mature Arendt would claim that an individual’s self-disclosure in 
politics was freedom in general, we might suppose that in her youth Arendt 
held a vague vision of freedom as self-disclosure, though in her Marburg or 
Heidelberg years she was not connecting it directly with political life. 
Following young Arendt’s definition of dreams as the realm where one lives 
a “proper life” and “merges entirely with what one dreams”—thus where one 
has a deep understanding of the world—I can say that mature Arendt’s vision 
that human freedom fulfils mainly by speaking out our uniqueness and our 
                                                 
33 Cf. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 176: “Through speech and action, men 
distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct. […] With word and deed we insert 
ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth”; eadem, On Revolu-
tion, op. cit., p. 130: “Tyranny, in other words, deprived of public happiness, though not 
necessarily of private well-being, while the republic granted to every citizen the right to be 
‘a participator in the government affairs,’ the right to be seen in action”. 
34 As quoted in: E. Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For the Love of the World, New Haven–
London 2004, p. 484. 
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specific understanding of the world,35 is comparable to the way we tend to act 
in dreams. Namely, in dreams our words and deeds, though often “irrational” in 
terms of waking life, often involuntarily underline what is most important for 
us and for people we encounter as well as integrate different spheres of our life. 
In other words, strange things we do in dreams “are” our uniqueness, our 
story; dreams capture our uniqueness to the extent that is impossible in reality. 
The fact that in dreams this perfect storytelling and uniqueness are expressed 
involuntarily, makes Arendt’s concept of political action even more corre-
sponding with the realm of dream, and proves even more that coming closer to 
dreamlike reality is a model of politics in Arendt’s thought. It is because when 
Arendt describes—and praises—self-disclosing in political action and the indi-
vidual’s “urge toward self-disclosure,”36 she also strangely writes that “unpre-
dictability of outcome is closely related to the revelatory character of action 
and speech, in which one discloses one’s self without ever either knowing him-
self or being able to calculate beforehand whom he reveals.”37 In politics, we 
should speak consciously our views, but at the same time try to attain the same 
involuntary, symbolic level of disclosure and integration of our personal life 
experience, wishes and self-decidedness as we see in our dreams. 
Although the words “dream” or “der Traum” used by Arendt in Die Schatten 
might also mean conscious phantasies, the context—namely, the fragment 
about waking from the sleep—suggests that “dream” means primarily things 
seen while sleeping. Nonetheless, her youthful essay Die Schatten as well as 
the philosopher’s lifelong devotion to poetry undoubtedly show that not only 
a night dream as a harmonious disclosure of human questions, but also some 
form of daydreaming were important for Arendt and might have influenced her 
vision of politics as a demonstration of, I may say, objectified subjectivity, con-
sisting in “being seen and being heard by others [that] derive their significance 
from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position.”38 In the 
context of links between dreams, daydreaming and self-disclosure, it is inter-
esting that in Die Schatten Arendt admits that in her search for answers to exis-
tential questions, she went “in some way above what is private and intimate in 
order to bring closer what is human” (“gewissermaßen über das Private und 
Intime hinaus menschlich näher zu bringen”39). 
                                                 
35 This subjectivism is in line with Arendt’s criticism of mass society in which only one 
viewing perspective is allowed: “The end of the common world has come when it is seen only 
under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective” (H. Arendt, The 
Human Condition, op. cit., p. 58). 
36 Ibidem, p. 194. 
37 Ibidem. p. 192. 
38 Ibidem, p. 57. 
39 H. Arendt, M. Heidegger, Briefe 1925 bis 1975…, op. cit., p. 24. 
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I can sum up Arendt’s vision of action in three elements. The political actor 
is (1) directly speaking out his views on current public problems through his 
individualistic will to gain “fame” and to make his name “known,”40 (2) com-
municating his private views and feelings through making it understandable to 
others thus making possible the views mentioned in element (1),41 (3) indi-
rectly and involuntarily disclosing his personal history, emotions and experi-
ence—the thing Arendt calls “daimon.” These three elements sum up into 
a story told by the political actor, and second and third view has, in its ideal 
form, something to do with symbolism experienced in a dream, where even 
political and theoretical problems tend to be expressed better. 
Of course, contrary to strong connotations about dreaming, when I talk 
about “strange things” we do in dreams, I do not mean erotic themes of some 
dreams, but rather dreams like the one dreamt by Rahel Varnhagen, as it is 
evoked by Arendt in her book about Varnhagen: “[Rahel] found herself in 
a splendid, inhabited palace, [but] despite the fact the doors were open, […] she 
was never able to join the people,” instead, in the dream Rahel “was everytime 
six or eight rooms away” and found there a strange animal.42 In Rahel’s another 
dream, she and one of her female friends were seeing Mother of God (Mary), 
but “could not see her distinctly,” because, despite being in the room, the saint 
was covered by some kind of clouds. Rahel and her friend asked themselves 
and the saint existential questions. “The Mother of God […] only said Yes! to 
each question,” for example “do you know the suffering of love?”—recollected 
Rahel, as quoted by Arendt. At the end of this interrogation, Rahel—of course in 
her dream—was crying and screaming: “I have not done anything! […] “I am 
innocent!”43 
The homely ideal of public space, understood as inspired by the idea of re-
capturing dream life might raise questions about nightmares. I am aware that 
dreams can also display injustice, aggression and wars. When I evoke Arendt’s 
words of “merging with things that we dream,” I do not mean understanding of 
“dream” as “paradise.” I rather mean a dreamy state of the world in which our 
actions and words, as well as actions of other people, limitlessly demonstrate 
our uniqueness, and, sometimes exaggerate while reflecting one’s conscious 
interpretation of reality, make us aware of the true bad or good nature of real 
situations. Sometimes symbolic situations displayed in dreams inform us what 
                                                 
40 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., pp. 181 and 193. 
41 Eadem, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 72–77. 
42 Eadem, Rahel Varnhagen. The Life of a Jewish Woman, New York–London 1974, pp. 
134–145. 
43 Ibidem, pp. 141–142. 
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could be done in a specific situation in real life, and how my behaviour affects 
others, and in which light I can reflect upon reality and relations between peo-
ple. Based on Varnhagen’s dream life, Arendt commented that dreams have 
“the explicitness and clarity of a world which was not provided for in the 
day.”44 Dreamy harmony consists thus, as I tried to show above, not—or maybe 
not always—in a paradise, but in a better clarity and sharpness of the world, 
and, paradoxically, as Arendt argued in her book on Rahel, dreamy harmony 
consists in more possibilities and more sense-making of our acting in the 
world. The dreams of Rahel Varnhagen, of which examples were described 
above, are the allegory of identity-seeking, both in personal and public-political 
terms, or rather are good example of unification of these two realms: Varnha-
gen as a creator and host of a Romantic literary salon and as a person who, for 
Arendt mainly as a Jewish woman, wants to find her identity within her society 
as well as to ask and answer questions about assimilation. 
Of course 19-year-old Arendt had not yet been a political philosopher, but it 
might be true that the wish from the ending of Die Schatten reflects vaguely her 
later postulate of creating a public realm which would be a realm of homeliness 
for all, where each citizen could disclose his or her uniqueness and feel a sense 
of community, and from which—contrary to social realm, where, according to 
Arendt’s reasonable diagnosis, we tend to “discriminate” persons with whom 
we do not want to spend time—no one could be thrown away. The wish to 
have home in the political realm arose both from Arendt's personal feeling of 
estrangement, linked to her psychological characteristics45 and from political 
unhomeliness such as the experience of war, antisemitism, and being a refu-
gee in France and the United States. The line from Arendt’s poem written in 
1946, which encompasses this difficult experience, confirms that craving for 
the political realm of free participation is somehow the wish to evoke the ideal 
that dwells in a dream world: “Lucky is he who has no home: he sees it still 
in his dreams.”46 (As for Arendt the Greek political participation was an ideal 
                                                 
44 Ibidem, p. 137. 
45 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl writes about Hannah Arendt’s school years in Königsberg: 
“While schoolmates visited and chatted during school recesses and over lunch, she marched 
around the schoolyard, hands clasped behind her back, braids bouncing, lost in solitary 
thought” (E. Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 33). I think this description is very suggestive. Hannah’s 
willingness to spend time alone could have arisen from the fact that she could have found 
teenagers’ chatting stupid, or from the fact the schoolmates might have not accepted her, or 
perhaps from the fact that she might have had some problems which needed to be resolved 
in the process of solitary thinking. Of course, maybe all these three interpretations are to 
some extent true. 
46 As quoted in: ibidem, p. 188. 
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of politics, we can half-jokingly say that one of Rahel’s dreams she evokes—
the dream where “people were all dressed like Athenians”47—proves that 
Arendtian vision of politics, based on plurality and complex internal richness of 
each person, would be fulfilled in treating the political realm as the one recap-
turing the condition from a dream.) 
There are uncountable cases where our dreams can reveal a link between 
political situation, social conditions and personal feelings (as Arendt would say, 
this results from human plurality and capacity to think and act). The theme of 
this article allows me, as I hope, to evoke two examples in the form of my own 
dreams. I had these dreams and wrote them down almost a decade ago, and 
what is interesting, while dreaming I met Józef Piłsudski—a Polish national 
hero, who was one of the creators of Polish independence in 1918. This kind of 
“meeting” informs us about another political function of dreams: in dreams we 
have an ability to reflect a political situation together with the great heroes of 
our history, and these encounters and mere presence of these people in our 
dreams is an element which bonds a political community—of course, only 
when we tell each other our dreams. This way of celebrating our bonds with 
political community can surpass the thoughtless, simplifying and anti-individu-
alistic phenomenon of political polarisation that occurs in some countries. 
In my dream from 20th January 2010, I was sitting outside on stairs in 
a typical Polish backyard. I think it was somewhere in Warsaw. The buildings 
surrounding the yard were quite old, like from pre-war Poland. Moreover, on 
the right there was a retro-style signboard, where blue letters were on a white 
background: “Pralnia” (“Laundry”). Suddenly, Józef Piłsudski, in his typical 
military coat and with his characteristic moustache, went out through the door 
in front of me, and walked down from the entresol. “This is not the best 
place”—he spoke to me.—“Surely you must have read it in my diary…”— 
he added, suggesting that I knew why the place was not “the best.” And then 
he started to tell me something about the current politics of European Union. 
I remember I was listening to him rather than participating in a discussion. 
The night before the real presidential election in Poland, in the dream from 
4th July 2010, I was in a prison together with Józef Piłsudski, who was my only 
co-prisoner in a cell. Leaning on a windowsill, through a very small window 
I saw that the sun was going down and the sky was turning dark blue. Suddenly 
I noticed that the window overlooked only tiny space just above the ground. 
That meant the cell was partly under the ground. I was scared by that limited 
access to the outside world, all the more so because I and Piłsudski had not yet 
got any dinner. Then I asked Piłsudski: “Could you read something for me from 
                                                 
47 H. Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen…, op. cit., p. 138. 
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the newspapers?” He had newspapers upon his knees and, as he was viewing 
and shuffling them, I recognized the characteristic retro headlines of pre-war 
newspapers. And Piłsudski started to read loudly some press articles for me. 
The reading was calming me down. 
 
Arendt’s “Dreaming Philosophy” and the Main Themes  
of the Rest of Her Philosophy 
 
Understanding Arendt’s concept of the political as the concept—which I would 
describe as the-political-as-recapturing-dreamy-harmony—solves, in a twofold 
way, the problem of Arendt’s sharp distinction between public and private 
realms. In addition, these two interpretations I propose—which can be com-
plementary—also reflect the question (which I tried to address in my earlier 
investigations48) about whether Arendt is a conservative supporter of “tran-
scending one's needs” or rather a philosopher of imagination and creative indi-
vidualism?49 According to the first interpretation, dreams, owing to their sym-
bolic nature, always integrate public and private matters. Our mind produces 
dreams independently of our planning, we never know what we will dream 
about, even if one can suppose likely content (if recently the magpie killed my 
canary, then it would be very probable that I would have nightmares about this 
event). As independent of our planning, the dreaming harmony between public 
and private realms is itself, even if full of our interests, “transcendent,” coher-
ent, spontaneous, and not “corrupted” by our non-ideal daily thinking and by 
exaggerated mode of calculative economic thinking. Taking into consideration 
that “economic thinking” is sometimes not bad, but sometimes really can be 
                                                 
48 Cf. A. Czepiel, Szczęśliwy człowiek kontra dobry obywatel? Zmagania z myślą Hanny 
Arendt (Happy Self vs. Good Citizen? A Struggle with Hannah Arendt’ Thought), Warszawa 
2017. 
49 This problem can be reflected by the fact that in the chapter The Public Realm: The 
Common in The Human Condition Arendt gives two definitions of the public sphere. The men-
tioned chapter gives us some “clearance” (Heideggerian “die Lichtung”) that justifies the 
suspicion that two ways of understanding the public action, free speech, individual needs etc. 
can appear even inside the same text by Arendt because the philosopher sympathised with 
both ways of understanding. Referring to these two definitions, we can say that sometimes 
Arendt affirms freedom and public action as “free speech,” “communicating our judgments 
and feelings,” “spontaneous action”—i. e. the way that allows the integration of personal and 
political matters—and sometimes she understands freedom as, so to speak, “silencing our 
subjective private needs while being in public.” However, it seems to be even more compli-
cated because the individual will to be “proud” allows, in my opinion, to integrate the per-
sonal and the political, but Arendt qualifies it—with clearly non-conservative affirmation—
as a part of the second (we may say “anti-subjectivist”, conservative) definition of the public. 
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exaggerated, the interpretation above is a good, dream-affirming outcome of 
a rather disturbing fact that, quite pessimistically and conservatively, Arendt 
criticized the appearance of self-interest, including economic welfare, in politi-
cal world; she believed it can easily transform itself into a “public struggle for 
private things.”50 She also feared that the public appearance of economic inter-
est could risk replacing the unpredictability of human action by a list of statisti-
cal behaviours51 (however, another aspect of this view is her promotion of 
nonconformism, which is quite a romantic idea; but—and this question can 
sum up also my book about Arendt from 2017—why could not the way we 
speak about socioeconomic matters disclose our uniqueness and noncon-
formism?). Moreover, even if there is not a question of “corruption of public 
realm with private interests,” there can be the “risk” of non-perfect compro-
mise between public and private domains: one might exaggerate both of them, 
or, at least if we “have” to put something private in politics, we could choose 
a wrong private thing, and so on. In other words, I can put it that way: for Han-
nah Arendt, if dream life was true life, a sharp public-private distinction would 
not be needed, as in James Madison’s words, “If men were angels, no govern-
ment would be necessary.”52 
In The Human Condition Arendt claims that technical thinking can finally 
change the world into a “dream produced by man”: “This mathematically pre-
conceived world may be a dream world where every dreamed vision a man 
himself produces has the character of reality only as long as the dream lasts.”53 
I think it is not a critique of a dreamlike world itself. What may be disadvanta-
geous to Arendt is the fact that the dreams would not be a surprise, but they 
would technically be created by people. Because in dreams our wishes some-
times come true, we can point out that the conservative postulate of the de-
fence of civilisation through openness to the transcendent or, as Stawrowski 
calls it, to the “unpredictable-yet-not-accidental”54—if only we treat dreams as 
                                                 
50 Cf. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 35. 
51 Ibidem, pp. 42–43. 
52 J. Madison, The Federalist Paper No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish 
the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments, [online] https://www. 
constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm [accessed: 22.07.2019]. 
53 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 286. 
54 Z. Stawrowski, Świat zadowolonych głupców (The World of Content Fools), “Rzecz-
pospolita Plus Minus”, interviewed by M. Płociński, 6–7.07.2015. Other examples of conserva-
tive thinking—or at least of what I mean when I write about “conservatives”—are: Ch. Delsol, 
La haine du monde. Totalitarismes et postmodernité, Paris 2016, and R. Legutko, The Demon in 
Democracy. Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies, New York 2016. The fact that I criticize 
conservatives does not mean that I support everything that is deemed “non-conservative” 
(for example infidelity to one’s life partner or hatred towards patriotism and religion). 
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transcendent!—has the potential of happiness and not only of, so to speak, 
“suffering for the sake of Kantian moral law.” In other words, the openness to 
transcendence can bring not only the idea of self-accusation of sin but also the 
idea of praying to God for personal happiness, for example for a chance to be 
with the beloved one. Moreover, Arendt’s critique of technology is not at all that 
conservative because technical thinking, introspection that is divided from 
reality, is based—according to Arendt—on individual’s abandoning of five 
senses, while conservatives would rather speak about downfall consisting in 
“seeking for what is sensual” and the “egoistic” hope that an individual’s good 
dreams will be fulfilled in our waking, sensual reality. Dreams, we might say, 
are not mere introspection that was criticised by mature Arendt in The Human 
Condition: the sensations we experience in dreams—joy, pain, surprise caused 
by events we see in dreams or things we hear about others’ dreams—are often 
even more vivid than in waking life, and after waking up we remember them as 
vivid (as in Arendt’s poem from 1951: “The multi-colored layers in my sleep / 
Which fear the precipitous void of our world”55). Some dreams, though recog-
nized as unreal, are remembered by us as our most important memories are. 
According to the second interpretation, we have to accentuate—contrary to 
Die Schatten, a self-analysis written by young Arendt—mature Arendt’s afore-
mentioned aversion towards memories and introspection. Biographers notice 
that she did not say much about her childhood, youth, and emotional life even 
to her closest friends. Arendt’s personal memories and emotional states are, 
I think, rarely described in the correspondence with her husband Heinrich 
Blücher.56 Commenting on Arendt’s friendship with Mary McCarthy, Kathleen 
B. Jones observes that “Arendt’s brutally honest mentoring of McCarthy in mat-
ters of the heart seemed to be a barrier behind which she kept her most self-
revelatory feelings and fears to herself. Even though she talked with McCarthy 
about her concerns about Blücher’s health and her feelings for her former 
lover, the notorious Martin Heidegger, Arendt didn’t speak in the voice or with 
the vulnerability any woman, no matter how intellectual, might use to express 
her most intimate fears or joys with her ‘closest woman friend.’”57 Although 
                                                                                                                   
My critique of conservative thinking consists in the fact that the opinion that “my wishes, 
though I wish happiness, are also ethical” is suspicious for conservatives. The titles of the 
mentioned works show themselves that it does not take much to be called “the killer of civili-
sation” by a conservative thinker. 
55 E. Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 90. 
56 Cf. H. Arendt, H. Blücher, Briefe 1936–1968, ed. L. Kohler, Münich 1996. The letter from 
August 1945 (p. 137), where Arendt talks about her constant struggle to hide her fears, is one 
of the exceptions. 
57 K. B. Jones, Hannah Arendt’s Female Friends, “LA Review of Books”, 12.12.2013, [online] 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/hannah-arendts-female-friends/ [accessed: 8.07.2019]. 
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Jones finds that Arendt’s friendship with Hilde Fränkel was more intimate, 
I think her letter to Fränkel from 10th February 1950,58 where Arendt is de-
scribing her reunion with Heidegger during her first post-war visit to Europe, 
is rather joking and ironic, avoiding any description of internal emotional life, 
despite the fact that after the meeting Arendt wrote to Heidegger himself that 
their reunion was for her “a confirmation of a whole lifetime.”59 A similar ob-
servation is made by Young-Bruehl, who writes that “Arendt’s opposition to 
introspection was politically understandable and fruitful, but it also provided 
justification for her distance from her own family memories, her own painful 
childhood and legacy of shyness, moodiness, impatience, and incommunica-
tiveness”60—observes Young-Bruehl. 
Hence, we may expect, the rigid public-private distinction in Arendt’s 
thought. However, this distinction is not limitless: let us return here to the fact 
that Arendt, while criticising personal motivations of political activity, claims in 
The Human Condition that politics is about disclosing uniqueness of every act-
ing person. And what would the “uniqueness” even be, if it was not about our 
personal – both emotional and socioeconomic—problems and interests? Here 
comes Arendt with her views that the political activity must consist in “com-
municability” of our opinions and feelings;61 the political realm must be about 
individual’s “telling one’s story”62 in an objectified way that is understandable 
to others. The experience of perfect dreamlike harmony—affirmed by Arendt, 
as I tried to show, throughout her life—is the answer that solves the problem of 
contradiction between Hannah Arendt’s idea of expressing one’s “uniqueness” 
in the political realm and her aversion towards the presence of private and 
intimate matters in public. The expressing of uniqueness seems to consist in 
the idea of the symbolic reality of a dream, where an individual is present in his 
or her uniqueness without reporting his or her private life in detail, because—
by means of the specific, strange dreamlike harmony—all is “known” to others, 
the world symbolises problems and concerns of mine and others. Our private 
concerns—as young Arendt wrote—“merge” with all other concerns, so that 
public deeds voluntarily symbolise private problems and even solve them, and 
vice versa (we may think again of the above-mentioned dreams about Piłsud-
ski). Although in the waking life it is impossible to perfectly recapture this in-
                                                 
58 H. Arendt, Wie ich einmal ohne Dich leben soll, mag ich mir nicht vorstellen: Briefwechsel 
mit den Freundinnen Charlotte Beradt, Rose Feitelson, Hilde Fränkel, Anne Weil-Mendelsohn 
und Helen Wolff, Hrsg. U. Ludz, I. Nordmann, München 2017. 
59 As quoted in: S. Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, London 2003, 
p. 223. 
60 E. Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 90. 
61 Cf. H. Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 72–77. 
62 Cf. eadem, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 175. 
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voluntarily, spontaneous condition of dream life, coming closer and closer to 
this ideal might be a good idea about political life; about public debate. Bio-
graphically speaking, Arendt’s psychological strict unwillingness towards talk-
ing publicly about personal problems is confronted with her deep conviction 
that our personal history really counts in meta-political thinking, and Arendt’s 
“dream about dreamlife of politics” was perhaps based on the fact that, al-
though, she does not speak in public, and even to her friends, about her private 
life, her dreams do this for her: Arendt was relieved of telling directly about her 
personal life in public and in her philosophical texts, and at the same time 
dreams were making her realise that personal story is important in philosophy 
and politics, and she was telling her story in a dreamlike way—metaphorically 
and indirectly—in her philosophical books (an example is the presence of Au-
gustinian phrase “amo: volo ut sis” in The Origins of Totalitarianism: these 
words are strictly linked to Arendt’s youthful love relationship.) Hence—
perhaps—the idea described in The Human Condition that true political life 
consists in “telling one’s story” in the way that a person’s “daimon”—his or her 
emotional and spiritual life, imagination and private motivations—is involun-
tarily “visible” and interplays with the political every time when a person tells 
in public his or her “true opinion” (term from On Revolution63). And, because 
Arendt herself writes that we feel “urge towards disclosure,”64 the disclosing 
person—we can know it from our experience of public discussions—knows 
she discloses also her “daimon,” even if she, unlike in the dream, does not sum 
it up or even is incapable of summing it up. Then dreams, as a role model, in-
spire this person how to act to express the “daimon.” 
Based on two interpretations presented above, another observation is wor-
thy of attention. Dreams involve spontaneous integration of our different prob-
lems and thoughts, including public and private concerns. They might not al-
ways do so by establishing peace between them, but simply by displaying them 
in our head like a film and thus being a phenomenon of “appearance” which 
was important for Arendt's idea of vita activa. Dreams, we might say, due to 
their symbolic character integrate vita contemplativa and vita activa without 
the duty of finding a strict, proper limit between public and private, from 
which, like from the door, we might fly out into the public world; the door that 
Arendt sometimes conservatively closes, as when she criticises caring of our-
selves by means of politics („[it is a] curiously hybrid realm where private in-
terests assume public significance”65) or where she says that “thinking […] has 
                                                 
63 Eadem, On Revolution, op. cit., p. 226. 
64 Eadem, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 194. 
65 Ibidem, p. 35. 
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no political relevance unless special emergencies arise.”66 Instead, dream itself 
is flying out. For Arendt, who sometimes joyfully flies out by stressing only the 
aspect of courageous making our name known through presenting our unique 
imagination in discussion, instead of sticking to her concept of a strict border 
between public and private, dreams would really be a harmonious place to 
realise vita activa (“An ‘enlightened,’ in fact rather mechanical, opposition of 
reason and passion does not enlighten us very much on the great subject of the 
human capabilities,”67 Arendt wrote.) 
 
Daily and Dreamy Romanticism 
 
In our waking thoughts we consider and try to link different interests and 
wishes, the personal and political, and different interpretations of the same 
situation. This complicatedness is often too hard to sum up in one phrase, and 
it is also dependent on external events and moods (described by romantic 
poets and Heidegger) in which some expectations and thoughts seem more 
important than others. In Mickiewicz’s Forefathers’ Eve Konrad’s proud 
improvisation and priest Piotr’s humble praying reflect, as I think, two sides of 
a human being, or rather—of human condition. These poetic situations indicate 
that there is always hope that the one who fears she is not right would win at 
the end. The force of dreams, one might say, consists in integrating and explain-
ing this complexity, involuntarily creating “one mood” made of our daily moods 
(which, of course, are not our “untrue selves,” but are important for cognition). 
Even though Arendt, in her book on Varnhagen, tends to ironise the roman-
tic sacralisation of “the boundlessness of the Mood,”68 claiming that it was 
“magic” rather than real, the very words she uses to seemingly ironise romanti-
cism present her vision of the political realm: “Playing with possibilities engen-
dered the ‘Romantic confusion’ which canceled the isolation of the Schleier-
macherian individual that for a moment it seemed as if reality might invade the 
scene after all by sheer chance, by a surprise attack. But this would have to be 
pure extraordinariness, a miracle […] Expectation of the extraordinary never 
lets reality have its say, so to speak.”69 Arendt herself described human action 
as “unexpected” and “spontaneous,” mainly the political action,70 the situation, 
                                                 
66 Eadem, The Life of the Mind, op. cit., p. 192. 
67 Eadem, On Revolution, op. cit., p. 225. 
68 Eadem, Rahel Varnhagen..., op. cit., p. 60. 
69 Ibidem, pp. 60–61. 
70 However, in Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt claims that spontaneity can also be 
a characteristic of the private realm. In my opinion, this view saves Arendt’s philosophy from 
the interpretation that our private life cannot be based on spontaneous acts. 
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which I would characterise as I-have-to-speak-out-my-unique-opinion” (in my 
view this is also, to be honest, an act of caring about myself). In The Human 
Condition she claims: “The new always happens against the overwhelming odds 
of statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical, everyday pur-
poses amounts to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of 
a miracle. The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can 
be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. 
And this again is possible only because each man is unique.”71 Hannah Arendt’s 
irony of romantic “boundlessness of the Mood”72 ends up in praising political 
spontaneous action as “boundless,”73 and that makes me think even stronger 
that spontaneity was for Arendt a kind of mood in which we enter into public 
debate. Arendt’s critical, but undeniable fascination with romanticism from the 
time of writing the book on Rahel continues in The Human Condition. 
Because Arendt affirms—as a central point of her concept of political 
realm—waiting for unexpected, doing unexpected, and imagining the unex-
pected, in this light the words from Varnhagen book: “In expecting a miracle 
that does not arrive, the imagination conjures up ‘the most interesting situa-
tions’”74 become less ironic. Even if some situations would not occur, imagina-
tion—daily as well as dreamy—would be politically important, it will show 
what should happen, what we should do, and what we would gain or lose if 
a specific scenario happens. It seems that according to Arendt the romantic, 
expecting, and hopeful “boundlessness of the Mood” is good as long as the 
mood is natural and it is not artificially “conjuring up future moods which con-
vert all reality into the neutralized ‘it has already happened.’”75 This notion 
provokes us to guess that Arendt’s critique of romanticism is rather a critique 
of artificialisation of romanticism, when romanticism is no longer about per-
sonal authenticity and becomes “fashion.” For example, in The Origins of Totali-
tarianism anything could be “romanticized”—“people, state, family, nobility”—
if only “paying patron asked for it.”76 Even in the case when romanticism is 
honest, Arendt does rather not believe that a “romanticization” of something 
can survive longer than a “moment’s notice.” But her quite romantic (emotion-
ally-based) concepts are different: her “constitutive longing” from the 1925 
essay Die Schatten, as well as mature concept of public happiness we may rec-
ollect after a political event—these are stable yet romantic moods. 
                                                 
71 Eadem, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 177. 
72 Eadem, Rahel Varnhagen..., op. cit., p. 60. 
73 Eadem, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 195. 
74 Eadem, Rahel Varnhagen..., op. cit., p. 61. 
75 Ibidem. 
76 Eadem, Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., pp. 165–170. 
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Arendt herself—maybe as a supporter of true romanticism—seems to ap-
preciate Rahel for her being a romantic hero, for acting out from her genuine 
immediate feeling, for her ability to disclose her mood: “She was able to play 
the part demanded by the moment. She could work her magic upon all who 
came to her; she was able to handle the miscellaneous personalities of her sa-
lon; she was in her element when she was able to play so upon her circle that 
each person said exactly what was most brilliant at the particular moment. 
Never again was she as effective as she was during this period; never again did 
she wield such power over people; never again did she impress people as so 
entirely herself in all her uniqueness. […] In ‘romantic confusion’ there lay 
a chance to permit reality to break in”77—writes Arendt in her early book, and 
we have to remember that biographers agree that Hannah Arendt, writing 
a book and minor texts on Rahel Varnhagen, treated Rahel as her alter ego78). 
What was for Arendt a model of the public sphere was a romantic salon, in 
which our dreamy harmonious uniqueness together with map of problems and 
wishes—as Rahel’s identity-seeking—was transposed to real life at a greater 
level than in modern political life (as Arendt wrote, dreams represented Rahel’s 
problems with entering the common world79 and “were the continuation of the 
day”80). In her text from 1933, 27-year-old Arendt reveals that salons were 
something like the political realm on private estates, consisting in direct debate, 
“self-presentation” of citizens instead of “representation”81 (as we can see, 
Arendt links romanticism with direct democracy). Hence, we may suppose how 
Arendt’s later idea of the political arises, namely we have to create a political 
realm as the common world of appearance and free speech, a big romantic 
salon. Without this sphere—which at the same time would in some way recap-
ture dreamlike harmony and symbolism—the world is a void, as Arendt claims 
in one of her poems written in 1951: “The multi-colored layers in my sleep / 
Which fear the precipitous void of our world.”82 As Arendt writes about Varn-
hagen’s dreams, “Rahel always found herself in a world more distinguished 
than the one in which she belonged”—and politically we can understand this as 
                                                 
77 Eadem, Rahel Varnhagen..., op. cit., pp. 62–63. 
78 Cf. S. Benhabib, op. cit., pp. 1–22. Seyla Benhabib claims that: “In telling Rahel Varn-
hagen’s story, Arendt was engaging in a process of self-understanding and self-redefinition as 
a German Jew” (ibidem, p. 8). 
79 H. Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen..., op. cit., p. 137 
80 Ibidem, p. 138. 
81 Eadem, Original Assimilation. An Epilogue to the One Hundredth Anniversary of Rahel 
Varnhagen’s Death, [in] eadem, Jewish Writings, eds. J. Kohn and R. H. Feldman, New York 
2007, p. 28. 
82 E. Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 90. 
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a hint that our goal, at least if we agree with Arendt’s diagnoses, is to have the 
political sphere of plurality, in which everyone can present their complex 
views, as opposed to simplified modern representative democracy (or rather, 
I would say, quasi-democracy). 
Arendt’s claim that the political “telling one’s story”83 should be in some 
way “telling one’s dreams” and living according to dreamlike harmony, is re-
flected in her—rather unknown before84—youthful notes on the edition of 
Sophocles’s tragedies from 1924, which were published by Bard College in 
April 201685 and which I tried to decipher. There are four hints that inform us 
that Arendt might have taken these notes somewhere between 1926–1928 and 
that the book must have been part of Arendt’s pre-war book collection that 
survived the World War Two in Paris and was retrieved by Arendt after the 
war.86 Firstly, at the end of the book we can see a bookstore sticker: “Eugen 
Hütter Heidelberg Ludwigsplatz 12.” The “Ludwigsplatz” in Heidelberg in 1928 
changed its name to “Universitätsplatz.” Secondly, there are no English mar-
ginalia of the first three plays (Ajax, Elektra, King Oedipus) as if the mature 
philosopher would not have wanted to disturb her notes from the youth be-
cause of sentiment. Thirdly, the handwriting of the majority of annotations on 
the first three plays – including the annotations I will analyse below—is differ-
ent from English annotations in later parts of the book: they resemble Arendt’s 
handwriting from her letters to Erwin Loewenson from 1927–1928.87 The 
German notes are more sloppy and less legible than English ones—we can 
compare the latter with the English words “seat” and “sudden striking” written 
next to lines 185–195 of Agamemnon. Fourthly, a lot of German marginalia look 
like studying the construction of ancient Greek tragedy—a thing that would not 
rather be interesting for a mature philosopher. 
                                                 
83 Cf. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., pp. 175–193. 
84 I have found only one article which takes into consideration Arendt’s notes on this edi-
tion of Sophocles: S. Zappulla, Reading Antigone through Hannah Arendt’s Political Philosophy, 
[in:] “Art, Emotion and Value. 5th Mediterranean Congress of Aesthetics”, Cartagena 2011, pp. 
111–138. However, as the title suggests, the text does not adopt Arendt’s notes on Elektra. 
The author analyses a few notes made on Antigone. 
85 Sophoclis, Fabulae, [online] http://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Sophoclis-
Fabulae.pdf [accessed: 18.05.2019]. This is Arendt’s copy of: Sophoclis Fabulae, Oxonii 
(Oxford) 1924. Four annotations on Elektra, which are analysed by me in this article, are on 
the following pages of the PDF document: 38, 39, and 42. 
86 I am thankful to Ursula Ludz, the editor of Arendt’s correspondence, for the infor-
mation about the preservation of the collection of Hannah Arendt’s pre-war books. 
87 I have copies of these letters from Deutsche Literaturarchiv in Marbach, so I was able to 
compare them with the marginalia on Sophocles. 
28  ANNA CZEPIEL 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In Arendt’s book on Sophocles’s plays, around lines 410–430 of Elektra, 
there is a scene when one of the characters of the tragedy, Chrysothemis, says 
that she had seen her mother Klytaemestra telling her dream to Helios (the Sun 
God in ancient Greece). Arendt comments on that next to the line 424, underlin-
ing the word “Helios” (Ἡλ     in dative): “Helios rückt die Träume aus d.[em] 
Nachlaß”—which means: “Helios is withdrawing the dreams from the ar-
chive/heritage.” Through this quote, Arendt, probably as an about 20-year-old 
person, presents a view that “Helios”—some external spiritual force or internal 
belief, or maybe the mix of the two—has the power to make people disclose 
their dreams. I think that a connotation to Arendt’s later concept of “telling 
one’s story” as having political significance is justifiable, all the more so because 
the complex, messy and irrational reality of the dream, just like one’s feeling-     
-and-reason-based judgment before telling it publicly, must be made “commu-
nicable”88 (in some way “deindividualised”) when one wants to say it to some-
one or just write it down. And even if in Elektra Klytaemestra does not reveal 
her dream properly “in the public,” in the agora, but tells it quite privately to 
a god, the simple fact of speaking out the dream has a political significance that 
young Arendt also must have noticed: as we know, Klytaemestra is the queen 
of Mycenae, and her dream was about the remorse she had after killing her 
husband, king Agamemnon, in order to live with her lover Aegisthus. The 
dream, as recounted by the dreamer, was heard by a friend of princess Chryso-
themis who later told her about it, and then Chrysothemis told the mother’s 
dream to her sister Elektra, provoking her and her brother Orestes to take 
revenge on their father. There is a question whether Arendt meant “Nachlass” 
to be “archive” or “heritage.” In the first case, we can interpret the comment 
as if Helios would force Klytaemestra to take the dream out of her archive, 
a “wardrobe” of her mind. But if Arendt meant heritage—things a family inherit 
after someone’s death—it could have meant that, according to the thinker, in 
Sophocles’ play Helios forced Klytaemestra to reveal the dream that had been 
originally coming from the “heritage” of Agamemnon—namely, Agamemnon 
himself “sent” the dream to Klytaemestra after his death to inform the murder-
ers about the possibility of revenge. 
It is necessary to quote the content of Klytaemestra’s dream, as told by 
Chrysothemis to Elektra around line 420 of the tragedy: “The dream said that 
she [Klytaemestra] saw our father [Agamemnon] as if he were here in the light 
of this world and as her husband again; and he took his sceptre from Aegisthus’ 
hand and planted it hard next to the hearth. Immediately after that the sceptre 
shot out a branch whose blossoms covered the whole of Mycenae.”89 Later, in 
                                                 
88 Cf. H. Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 72-77. 
89 Ibidem. 
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lines 630–660, Klytaemestra refers to this dream (and to a second, unknown 
dream) in her prayer to another god, Phoebos Apollo. The queen’s praying is 
as follows: “Two dreams, both of nightmares here and there, my Lord. Lord 
Phoebos, if they are to come to some good, help them come to fruition but if 
they are to result in awful deeds, then let these deeds fall upon my enemies’ 
heads. And Lord, let no one conspire with others or plot against me to rob me of 
my livelihood, the wealth of the Atridae. Let me live, Phoebos this good life, the 
serene life as keeper of this royal sceptre.”90 We clearly see that Klytaemestra 
has already known that Elektra and Orestes want to kill her and Aegisthus in 
revenge, but this time she is full of self-conviction and she wants primarily to 
preserve her political and symbolic power of the queen. Yet Klytaemestra’s 
dreams make her unsure about her victory. Her dreams forecast either good or 
evil outcome. Next to Klytaemestra’s prayer to Apollo there is a comment by 
Hannah Arendt: “die Doppeldeutig.[keit] d.[es] Traumes! (Als bei Sop.[hocles] 
am mind.[estens]) ist diesem Gold d.[er] Klyt.[aemestra] zur Liebe erfor-
der.[liche]”—which translates as: “the ambiguity of the dream! (as in Sophocles 
at least) is this treasure of Klytaemestra that is necessary for her to love.”91 
In her comment, young Arendt refers to the play between good and bad fore-
casts from the dream, to the phenomenon of uncertainty, which later would 
become important for her concept of politics. Moreover, it is very probable that 
Arendt also refers to the specific dream of Klytaemestra told by Chrysothemis, 
because earlier, next to the lines 418–425 (where there is a description of 
a dream that “[Agamemnon] took his sceptre from Aegisthus’ hand and planted 
it hard next to the hearth. Immediately […] blossoms covered the whole of 
Mycenae”) Arendt similarly noted the ambiguity: “Zweideutigk.[eit] d.[es] 
Traumes! B.[ei] Herd ist, als demonstriert, nur Zweid.[eutigkeit]”—which can 
be translated as: “Ambiguity of the dream! At hearth there is, as it was demon-
strated, only ambiguity.” In both comments by Arendt, an emotion concerning 
the ambiguity of dreams is visible (maybe also because “Zweideutigkeit”—
“ambiguity”—is one of important terms of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
in which young Arendt found a language to describe her own self and, at the 
same time, as Arendt-Heidegger correspondence and Hans Jonas’s memories 
suggests,92 in her youth she might have been questioning Heidegger’s strict 
understanding of the ambiguity as an “improper self”). 
                                                 
90 I quote George Theodoridis’s English translation of Sophocles’s Elektra: https://bac-
chicstage.wordpress.com/sophocles/elektra/ [accessed: 2.07.2019]. 
91 At the end of Arendt’s comment, after the word “erforder[liche],” there is also the letter 
“K.”—however, it is impossible to guess what it could have meant. 
92 Cf. Heidegger’s letters to Arendt from 24th April 1925 and 1st May 1925. In the letter 
dated 24th April, Heidegger partly criticized Arendt’s Die Schatten. In the letter dated 1st May, 
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In her comments, Arendt seems to see that the ambiguity of the dream can 
bring a hope for Klytaemestra, but not in the sense that the murderer will avoid 
remorse and a form of punishment, but in the sense that—as in the recounted 
dream there is no bloody revenge, but beautiful blossoms growing after Aga-
memnon rightly takes the royal sceptre from Aegisthus—if Klytaemestra 
understood that Aegisthus should not be the king, and believed that the good-
ness and fruitfulness of the kingdom would arise only out of Agamemnon’s 
deeds and political wisdom, then Klytaemestra would learn to love properly—
she would learn to love her children, the kingdom, and the memory of Aga-
memnon. This interpretation corresponds with Arendt’s theological doctoral 
dissertation on love in the thought of Saint Augustine. Of course we know that 
at the end of the tragedy Klytaemestra does not regret anything and, together 
with Aegisthus, is killed by Orestes; however, independently of the ending of 
the tragedy, Arendt’s interpretation of the dream is a romantic practice of seek-
ing hope and “gleam of righteousness”93 in everything and everyone. Another 
note written by Arendt on Elektra seems to sum up her philosophical attitude 
to dreams and their worldly significance: next to the lines 500–502, when the 
Choir sings about Klytaemestra’s dream: “If the prophesy in this dire dream is 
not fulfilled then let us say it: / Prophesies and oracles do not exist in dreams,” 
Arendt notes:94 “Leere im Schlagen auf d.[en] Traum”—which translates more 
or less as: “[There is] emptiness in beating the dream.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
he seemingly accounted her emotional reaction to this critique: Hannah had a “frozen soul” 
(“frierende Seele”). It is probable that she might have felt disenchanted with her understand-
ing of the self, although using Heideggerian terms, turned out to clash with Heidegger’s own 
thinking and was deemed wrong by him. Cf. H. Arendt, M. Heidegger, Briefe 1925 bis 1975…, 
op. cit., pp. 26–28. Hans Jonas, who befriended Hannah Arendt during their student years in 
Marburg, confirms Arendt’s partly polemical approach towards Heidegger during that time. 
Jonas notes that despite the common atmosphere of students’ worship of Heidegger’s philos-
ophy, Arendt, even as Heidegger’s lover, preserved her “skepticism” which enabled her to 
critically examine Heidegger’s concept. Cf. H. Jonas, Memoirs, ed. Ch. Wiese, trans. K. Winston, 
London 2008, p. 60. 
93 Term from Adam Mickiewicz’s Forefathers’ Eve. 
94 Among four annotations analysed in this article, this one was the most difficult to deci-
pher, thus it poses the greatest risk of wrong deciphering. 
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Conclusion 
 
Both in The Origins of Totalitarianism95 and The Life of the Mind96 Arendt 
argues that worldly realm of human speeches and deeds consists in the fact 
that entering into a debate with others ends internal doubts of an individual: 
we have to speak as one person, and even if someone discloses publicly his or 
her doubts, these spoken doubts appear as part of harmonious “one person”; 
in this situation our doubts, concerns and wishes harmonise and thus we inter-
act with the world, although in the dream, according to Arendt’s reflections on 
Rahel Varnhagen, this harmony is greater: it makes our vision and understand-
ing of ourselves and of the world “sharper” and “clearer” than in the waking 
reality. This fact sheds light on the relation between a dream world and the 
political realm understood by Arendt as “lawful space of worldly appear-
ance:”97 in a dream we act directly out of our internal wishes and doubts, which 
harmonise with the world and are symbolised in our interactions with other 
people. With Arendt, who even in 1925 expressed her wish to have space for 
a free speech where her soul could come closer to the internal and worldly 
harmony experienced by her while dreaming, it turns out that the task of poli-
tics is to recapture the condition of a dream. Of course, the interpretation that 
the political sphere as coming close to dreamlike human condition does not 
explain everything in Arendt’s concept of the political. However, as everyone 
dreams and everyone sometimes thinks about politics (even in the form of 
a simple question: Why should I vote?), the interpretation I proposed in the 
present article can be informative not only with regard to Arendt’s quite com-
plicated thought, but also with regard to the matter of what the truth is and 
what the world is. 
It is important to stress that Hannah Arendt did not use to write down her 
own dreams. We have only two descriptions of her dreams: first, the biogra-
pher tells the youthful (around 1928) nightmare about death of a professor 
from Heidelberg98 (I guess it might have been Karl Jaspers); second, in 1970s in 
her philosophical diary Arendt wrote down her dream about talking with Kurt 
Blumenfeld, one of Arendt’s close friends, who died in 1963.99 Maybe it is true 
                                                 
95 H. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 476. 
96 Eadem, The Life of the Mind, op. cit., pp. 179–193 (chapter The two-in-one). 
97 Cf. P. Birmingham, Heidegger and Arendt: The Lawful Space of Worldly Appearance, [in:] 
The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, eds. F. Raffoul and E. S. Nelson, London–New Delhi–
New York 2013, pp. 157–163. 
98 E. Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 90. 
99 H. Arendt, Denktagebuch, vol. 2, Hrsg. U. Ludz, I. Nordmann, München 2003, p. 701. 
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that Arendt’s striving for political realm was in fact a disclosure of her lifelong 
dreams about having a homely realm where her personality would be spoken 
out. 
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